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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the design process in the automotive indus-
try has gone through a period of significant changes. Modern vehi-
cles present a complex interaction of a large number of embedded
Electronic Control Units (ECUs), interacting with each other over
different types of networks. Furthermore, there is a current shift in
vehicle architectures, from isolated control systems to more open
automotive architectures that would introduce new services such as
remote diagnostics and code updates, and vehicle-to-vehicle com-
munication. However, this increasing set of functionalities, net-
work interoperability, and system design complexity may introduce
security vulnerabilities that are easily exploitable.
Typically, modern vehicular control systems are not built with
security in mind. As shown in [7], using simple methods an at-
tacker can disrupt the operation of a car to either disable the vehi-
cle or hijack it, giving the attacker the ability to control it instead.
This problem is even more emphasized with the rise of vehicle au-
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tonomy; consequently, criticality analysis for various automotive
components will have to be completely re-done.
To address these issues, we have introduced a design framework
for development of high-confidence vehicular control systems that
can be used in adversarial environments. The framework employs
system design techniques that guarantee that the vehicle will main-
tain control, possibly at a reduced efficiency, under several classes
of attacks. This comprehensive end-to-end approach to the devel-
opment of vehicular control systems can be extended for the use in
most networked control systems that may be subject to a variety of
externally-originating attacks.
The overview of the development framework is shown in Fig. 1.
To protect against the set of attacks that is as extensive and diverse
as possible, we combine control-level techniques and code-level
techniques:
• During the control design phase, it is necessary to address at-
tacks on the environment of the controller, such as attacks on sen-
sors, actuators, communication media (i.e., the network) and com-
putational resources available to the controller. In this phase we
build upon ways to introduce redundancy within the control loop,
as well as methods for attack detection and identification. We uti-
lize security-aware attack-resilient estimators that identify attacks
and allow the controller to pursue a mitigation strategy. Therefore,
we refer to these as Control-level defenses.
• In the system development phase, the framework employs Code-
level defenses that prevent injection of malicious code into the op-
eration of the controller itself. This is achieved by providing secure
code synthesis for the derived controllers, with the goal to use a for-
mal representation of the execution and code generation semantics
to remove the uncertainty from the code generation process.
2. ATTACK-RESILIENT CONTROL
SCHEMES
In this phase, we have built on the work from [3, 4] where meth-
ods for compressed sensing and error correction over the reals were
used to derive a technique to develop secure state estimators when
system sensors or actuators are under attack. We assume that con-
trol design for the nominal case, when no attacks are present, has
Figure 1: Overview of the approach.
already been performed. Hence, we focus on state estimation tech-
niques that extend conventional state estimators to compensate for
exogenous attacks or to provide indications to the controller that
the system is under attack.
Most of the existing schemes for attack detection and identifi-
cation (e.g., [8, 3, 4]) are based on the knowledge of the exact
plant model. However, as the environmental conditions might af-
fect some of the model parameters, we combine the resilient esti-
mator with a controller scheme we have introduced in [9], which
is resilient to both attacks and limited perturbations in model pa-
rameters. Thus, the overall controller design (shown in Fig. 2)
guarantees that in the event the model becomes inaccurate, we can
maintain a minimum performance level for the closed-loop system.
Our framework has been illustrated on a cruise control case study,
in which a vehicle employs redundant sensor measurements (e.g.,
encoders, GPS, IMU) to maintain a predefined velocity even in the
case of attacks. In this regard, we have created a simulator, based
on the recently developed Robotic Operating System (ROS) [2], to
emulate the dynamics of a real unmanned ground vehicle. Using
this system, we have been able to demonstrate that our resilient
control strategy can guarantee a safe performance when less than
half of the sensors are under attack.
3. SAFE CODE GENERATION
Existing methods for designing secure control systems do not
offer coordinated control-level and code-level defenses. Tools like
Matlab allow us to model control laws and generate code, but secu-
rity properties of the generated code are not well studied. Our aim
is to prove that behavior of the control algorithm is preserved by code
generation and that no vulnerabilities are introduced in the process.
The code of control tasks is executed on top of the underlying
communication and computation platform. Therefore, proofs of
control code execution need to take properties of the platform into
account. We plan to precisely specify the services provided by the
platform and use these specifications in proof construction. We use
Figure 2: Diagram of the resilient controller.
architectural modeling to describe both the structure of the control
software and the capabilities of the platform that runs it. To achieve
this goal we utilize the Architecture Analysis and Design Language
(AADL) [5], developed for modeling embedded control system ar-
chitectures.
Code generation is performed by analyzing dependencies be-
tween expressions in the control law and generating code for the
individual expressions in the topological order of dependencies. In
this respect, code generation is similar to the one performed by the
Simulink Real-Time Workshop tool [1]. Platform-dependent as-
pects — that is, access to specific sensors and actuators, handling
of timers, etc. — should be “weaved in” afterwards. Currently, we
perform this part manually. Our plan, however, is to enhance the
code generator to perform this automatically based on the AADL
model, using an approach similar to that of Ocarina [6].
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